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Introduction
It is disputable how extensively the hermeneutically and historically oriented
“life-philosophy” (Lebensphilosophie) of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) influenced
Heidegger’s intellectual development in the period between the First World War
and the publication of Being and Time. There is a strong thesis, proposed by Charles
Guignon in his classic work Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (1983)
and developed by Theodore Kisiel (1993, 313) and Charles Bambach (1995, 232),
which maintains that a period of Heidegger’s thought in the early to mid-1920s was
influenced by Dilthey’s interpretation of concepts such as hermeneutics, historicity,
facticity, finitude, and generation to such an extent that an early draft of Being and
Time has been described as a ‘Dilthey draft.’1
A second more minimalistic interpretation suggests that the scope and depth
of Dilthey’s impact is overstated. It emphasizes an intellectual formation shaped
by other sources: modern German Scholasticism, the transcendental philosophy
of his teachers—Heinrich Rickert’s neo-Kantianism and Edmund Husserl’s
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phenomenology, and the general existential and life-philosophical intellectual
climate of the post-war years found in contemporaries such as Karl Jaspers and
Max Scheler.
A third interpretive middle path is indicated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, who
stressed the importance of Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg (1835–1897) in
Heidegger’s reception of Dilthey (Gadamer 1994, 23). Yorck was the politically
conservative, philosophically speculative, and pietistic Lutheran friend and corre-
spondent of Dilthey from 1877 to 1897. Yorck’s conservative style of thought,
which Heidegger was exposed to through the publication in 1923 of the Dilthey-
Yorck correspondence, powerfully shaped Heidegger’s reading of Dilthey. Dilthey’s
culturally and politically liberal and scientific orientation remained a stumbling
block for Heidegger even during his most enthusiastic reception of Dilthey’s work
(Gadamer 1994, 23).
Despite the cultural and political differences between Dilthey and Heidegger,
Heidegger continued to draw on concepts and strategies from Dilthey’s works in
Being and Time. The Yorckian character of Heidegger’s interpretation and use
of Dilthey is evident in the revealing statement: “the preparatory existential and
temporal analytic of Dasein is resolved to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in
the service of Dilthey’s work” (BT, 383/SZ, 404). This distinction between “spirit”
and “work” signals a cultural-political distance from Dilthey even as Heidegger saw
the project of Being and Time as continuing Dilthey’s research. Dilthey introduced
key concepts used by Heidegger and offered rich thick descriptive depictions of
multiple dimensions of human existence that Heidegger sought to radicalize. But,
as Heidegger maintained in The Concept of Time (1924), Dilthey’s work must
be re-oriented in light of Yorck’s ontological critique of Dilthey’s philosophy as
ultimately ontic, optical or ocularcentric, and positivistic.2
The hermeneutical tradition represented by Yorck, Heidegger, and Gadamer has
distrusted Dilthey of suffering from the two sins of modernism: scientific “posi-
tivism” and individualistic and aesthetic “romanticism.” On the one hand, Dilthey’s
epistemology is deemed scientistic in accepting the priority of the empirical, the
ontic, and consequently scientific inquiry into the physical, biological, and human
worlds; on the other hand, his personalist ethos and Goethean humanism, and his
pluralistic life- and worldview philosophy are considered excessively aesthetic,
culturally liberal, relativistic, and subjective.3
This essay involves two tasks in response to this negative evaluation of Dilthey
that has shaped our current understanding of his philosophical project; first, an
interpretation of the issues at stake in Heidegger’s reception of and struggle
with Dilthey. These issues touch upon language, historicity, and the nature of
hermeneutics. Secondly, by pursuing this task, I hope to question and challenge
the “overcoming” of Dilthey’s epistemic and life-philosophical hermeneutics in the
“ontological” or “philosophical” hermeneutics of Heidegger.
2See part one of Heidegger 2011/GA 64.
3See Hans-Georg Gadamer 1985; 2004, 214.
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Hermeneutics and the Question of Language
According to Guignon and Gadamer, as we have seen, Dilthey can be credited
with motivating the introduction of the language of “hermeneutics” and associated
terms into Heidegger’s early thought. But what is hermeneutics? “Hermeneutical”
signifies, according to Guignon, “a holistic field of “internal relations” in which
we find ourselves most originally as place-holders in a wider field of significance
relations” (1983, 3). Meaning occurs only through an interconnected nexus or
network (Zusammenhang) in which the particular is understood in relation to greater
wholes and wholes through the particulars that constitute them. This of course is the
most basic account of the “hermeneutical circle.”
One controversy in the reception of the early Heidegger is the role of language
and interpretation in his thought: is Heidegger operating within the paradigm of
the primacy of perception and consciousness or does he recognize their constant
meditation through structural processes of meaning? Already in the lectures of
the War Emergency Semester of 1919, published as Towards the Definition of
Philosophy, Heidegger articulated the interpretive character of intuition, perception,
and understanding. He described there how perceptual and intellectual processes
inherently involve the meaningfulness of linguistic mediation. Language is not a
theoretical object added on to a separate non-linguistic subject; language is more
primordially a practical life-context and medium (GA 56/57, 219-20).
In contrast to interpretations that deemphasize the role of language in
Heidegger’s early thought, Guignon rightly notes the priority of language in Being
and Time:
If we assume that the primordial roots and sources of our heritage are also embedded in
language, then the authentically historical encounter with the world may still be seen as
constituted by language.
At the deepest level, language is the medium in which the possibilities of understanding
of the heritage are conveyed to us. It contains the sources and origins of our most primordial
understanding of the world. As Heidegger says, “the essential is always handed over to
the future as the authentic heritage.” We reach this deepest level of language by “doing
violence” to common sense and by actually working through world-history in order to
remember its disguised message. (1983, 143)
“Intuition” and perception are not direct unmediated ways of accessing the
givenness of the world. Experience is already hermeneutical in being linguis-
tically constituted and, furthermore, occurs within “the immanent historicity of
life” (Heidegger TDP, 187/GA 56/57, 219). According to Guignon, Heidegger is
committed to a constitutive view of language:
On the constitutive view, language generates and first makes possible our full-blown sense
of the world. The constitutivist maintains that the mastery of the field of significance of
a world (as opposed to, say, an animal’s dexterity in its natural environment) presupposes
some prior mastery of the articulate structure of a language. The idea that one can first
have a coherent and fully worked-out grasp of a totality-of-significations onto which a
112 E.S. Nelson
totality-of-words is later mapped is on this view incoherent. Instead, words and world are
seen as interwoven in such a way that to enter into one is simultaneously to master the other.
(1983, 124)4
In addition to the generative character of language, another axis of nineteenth-
century hermeneutics, the art of interpretation developed by Friedrich Schleierma-
cher and Wilhelm Dilthey, is not lacking in Being and Time, as Guignon emphasized
(1983, 3). There is even a remainder of what Dilthey understood as the primary task
of psychological interpretation, self-reflection (Selbst-Besinnung), in Heidegger’s
early depiction of the interpretive self-reflection of the self about itself from the
perspective of its own self-world (Selbstwelt) as well as in relation to others
(Mitwelt) and the environing world (Umwelt).
While the early Heidegger rejected in the vein of Dilthey the appeal to a non-
linguistic ahistorical idealistic or vitalist intuition, he also stressed how intellectual
and conceptual categories arise from the movedness or motility of life. Whereas
the hermeneutics of facticity is the recognition that it is life interpreting itself, this
life is more mediated than the bare biological or intuitive life of vitalism. Life
involves from the beginning the need born of a lack that compels it to interpret and
conceptualize itself. Dilthey and Heidegger both critiqued the vulgar life-philosophy
and vitalism prevalent in contemporary popular German culture.
The need for reflection and thought are not alien to life or imposed from outside
of it. The vital human need to reflect springs from life itself and life and thought
are intertwined from the beginning in what Dilthey called the “categories of life.”
Heidegger elucidates how life’s very “categories can be understood only insofar as
factical life itself is compelled to interpretation” (PIA, 66/GA 61, 86-88). Though
concepts can do violence to life and its particularities, the self-articulation of life
from and to itself need not be “an unwarranted forcing” or the arbitrary violence
of what is external to life being imposed upon the immanent self-movedness of life
(Heidegger PIA, 66/GA 61, 86-88).
Human existence is inevitably entangled in language and history even as it
remains irreducible to being an expression or instantiation of a linguistic system
or historical generation. In the lecture-course Introduction to Phenomenological
Research, Heidegger depicts how existence occurs in and through words, and how
language is essentially hermeneutical: “All the primal conditions of language are,
for this reason, hermeneutical in their basic character—they are not meanings
regarding the matter of a “thing” but instead concern existence itself” (IPR, 240/GA
17, 314-16).
In Being and Time, language is not explicitly introduced as an existential category
until over a third of the way through the text. This led Taylor Carman to assert
that language does not have the priority suggested by Guignon (Carman 2003,
221). However, the question of language is present from the opening query into
the sense and meaning of the word being and the discussion of the Greek concept
4Compare, however, Taylor Carman’s critical discussion in Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation,
Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time (2003, 221).
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of logos. The language at stake throughout Being and Time is that of logos, rather
than everyday discourse as Rede. Logos does not mean reason or logic here but
interpolation and being addressed in the address; in hearing to and listening with
the other and oneself.
As the later Heidegger insisted, the logos is more than a gathering into one;
this gathering, as self-same yet non-identical, transpires between different voices
rather than being their assimilation to a monistic logos of identity. Heidegger’s
understanding of logos is rooted in his earlier elucidations of Aristotle. In the Basic
Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, Heidegger notes how hearing is a genuine
perception (aesthesis, ’š˝¢™˜¢š−) that makes visible the being of the human being
through the care and concern of listening to the human being’s speaking. It is
not the phonetic sound that is primary for Heidegger, despite Derrida’s charge of
phonocentrism, as: “There is phonetic speaking only because there is the possibility
of discourse, just as there is acoustical hearing only because being-with-one-another
is characterized originally as being-with in the sense of listening-to-one-another”
(HCT 266/GA 20, 366-68).
The empirical ontic hearing of sounds presupposes the ontological possibility of
listening to and hearkening to the other to the extent that even the deaf can still listen,
hearken, and respond to others. More questionable than physiological deafness is the
existential “deafness” of ordinary human beings to each other who hear but cannot
listen or hearken. Such denial in the pathology of not listening characteristic of
they (das Man) presupposes the possibility of a genuine listening to and encounter
with the other: “Someone who genuinely cannot hear, as when we say of a man,
‘he cannot hear’ (where we do not mean that he is deaf), is still quite capable of
hearkening : : : ” (HCT 267/GA 20, 368-69).
These and related passages from the mid-1920s lecture courses are the setting
for Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his technical term for the taking place of human
existence, as a fundamentally listening being in Being and Time. Heidegger’s earlier
and later understanding of ethos as dwelling in relation to the world, self, and others
resonates in this context when he speaks of being dispositionally attuned in and
through speech and silence. Ordinary in contrast with theoretical language does not
primarily concern referential propositions spoken from a neutral perspective; it is
intonation, modulation, and the “existential possibilities of attunement,” in which
one is attuned to others, which disclose existence (Heidegger BT, 157/SZ, 162).
Mood and attunement are made manifest and known in discursive language, and:
“Listening is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on
discourse, acoustic perception is based on hearing. Listening to : : : is the existential
being-open of Dasein as being-with for the other” (BT, 157-58/SZ, 163). Heidegger
returns to the hearkening summoning character of hearing in the early 1930s in
Being and Truth: “This hearing the other, and at the same time, one another, is
therefore no merely acoustic phenomenon; rather, it means hearing a summons,
lending an ear to a wish, listening to an order, assignment, and so on” (BAT, 123/GA
36/37, 157-58).
Hearkening, Heidegger notes, is a more primordial happening than psychological-
physiological hearing. Hearkening is not simply a recording of sounds; it “has
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the mode of being of a hearing that understands” (BT, 158/SZ, 163). In this
remark, we find evidence of the difference between a purely intuitive or perceptual
understanding of hearing and a hermeneutical one in which hearing is constituted
by interpretive understanding (Verstehen). Along with Befindlichkeit (attunement,
disposition, mood) and Rede (discourse, speech), Verstehen is one of the three lived
constituents or “existentialia” of the ‘there’” (the da) of Dasein through which
human existence is disclosed in its interpretedness: “Dasein’s “happening” also has
a hermeneutic structure: the events that make up a life gain their sense only from the
projected point of the life as a whole, and the possibilities of projection are always
determined by the events of that life” (Guignon 1983, 93).
Levinas, and other commentators relying on philosophy of the body, see a
betrayal of phenomenology in Heidegger’s purported intellectualizing of the senses
and the body insofar as these are elucidated through the notion of interpretive
understanding (verstehen) (BT, 157-58/SZ, 163).5 The clear distinction in the Ger-
man language between interpretive understanding (verstehen) and the intellectual
representational understanding associated with Verstand, and with Kantianism,
is lacking in other languages such as English in which both are translated as
“understanding.”
Heidegger’s critics on the issue of embodiment are correct that he did not
embrace the body and senses as entities that exist independently from rela-
tional processes of the generation of meaning such as interpretive understanding,
linguistic-historical mediation, and pragmatic relations with things. This criticism
presupposes a questionable gulf between embodiment and the bodily senses and
linguistic understanding and historical mediation. It is a disembodied body without
context, insofar as it is problematically assumed that the “elemental” can be isolated
from the pragmatic and that the senses and the body can be directly intuited outside
of language and history. It consequently risks reducing interpretive hearkening
and the understanding of being to the status of the proposition; that is, to the
cognitivist and the conceptualist interpretations of meaning that the hermeneutical
and pragmatist traditions have rightly challenged.
Heidegger carried out a hermeneutical and historical turn in phenomenology that
differentiates his thinking from existentialism and the phenomenological movement
(Guignon 1983, 4, 79). The interpretive turn that Heidegger adopted from Dilthey
and ontologically transformed entails that humans are always in a situation where
they are forced to interpret and reinterpret themselves, their moods and emotions,
and their senses and body.
Charles Guignon (1984) has described how moods offer a sense of Dasein as a
relational whole in Heidegger’s articulation of Befindlichkeit. Mood constitutes a
background context for what does and does not count as significant and mood is
not simply given but interpreted and potentially transformable in their relation to
interpretive understanding and discourse.
5On the problematic of the body in Heidegger and his critics, see Kevin Aho 2009.
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A philosopher should not just look, see, and describe, and assume that what
is seen applies universally beyond the perspectival care (Sorge) that orients a
world. Because intuition and perception already involve stratified interpretations
and conceptions, the destructuring (Destruktion) of those strata is called for in order
to encounter the phenomenon and begin to understand them anew for oneself. This
interpretive relation to one’s own “hermeneutical situation,” in which even the most
basic elements of the world and the self are encountered, entails possibilities of
revision and renewal as well as indifferent repetition. The interpretive finitude of
an existence entangled in words and historical contexts and conditions suggests a
precarious game; still, its dangerousness does not mean that it can be avoided.
Life-Philosophy, Historical Life, and Worldview
In addition to language, hermeneutics, and historicity, Heidegger stresses in his ear-
liest remarks concerning Dilthey the priority of the question of life, and particularly
the being and reality of the life that poses this question to itself. Heidegger describes
in “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview” (1925)
how this question of life and human life reflects a crisis in both knowledge and life
itself. This crisis has shaken the sciences and ordinary life itself and created the
conditions of a “struggle for a historical world view” (S, 148).
What distinguished Dilthey’s conception of life from other conceptions was
the threefold articulation of life in Dilthey’s mature magnum opus The Formation
of the Historical World in the Human Sciences (1910): (1) as experientially
lived (Erlebnis), (2) as structured through and embodied in its expressions and
objectifications (Ausdruck), and (3) as interpretively enacted and re-enacted in
understanding (verstehen). All three modalities are fundamentally historical insofar
as they encompass relations of resistance, conflict, and the fullness of a greater
life-context (Lebenszusammenhang) or interconnected web of overlapping and
conflicting meanings and interpretations.
Heidegger differentiated Dilthey’s interpretation of life as historically medi-
ated from the immediacy of both biological—whether biology is construed to
be mechanistic or vitalistic—conceptions of life as well as appeals to the self-
intuitive certainty or introspective transparency of life or consciousness to itself
in early lecture courses such as the Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.
Dilthey’s flawed conception of “life” remains fundamentally that of the historian,
since life becomes an external, formal, and ultimately aesthetic construction and
reconstruction of life even as it cannot attain the presumed objectivity of the natural
scientist.6
Despite Heidegger’s suspicions throughout the 1920s of the exteriority and
distance of life to itself in Dilthey, which is indeed what makes human life
6Compare, for example, Heidegger S, 152; PIE, 128, 159/GA 59, 145, 167; and Guignon 1983, 56.
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intrinsically interpretive and hermeneutical in Dilthey in contrast to philosophical
hermeneutics, Heidegger recognized at the same time the primordiality of the
question of life in Dilthey. Heidegger claimed in 1925 that “Dilthey penetrated into
that reality, namely, human Dasein which, in the authentic sense, is in the sense
of historical being. He succeeded in bringing this reality to givenness, defining it
as living, free, and historical” (S, 159). This is not “pure life,” as Heidegger notes
how Dilthey elucidates the “structures” of “the primary vital unity of life itself”
(S, 159). What Heidegger gestures to here are Dilthey’s “categories of life” (such
as selfsameness, doing and undergoing, and essentiality) that dynamically occur
within the nexus of lived reality. Life-categories are constituted and enacted in the
interpretive processes of life rather than grasped as fixed abstract categories or forms
of the understanding (Verstand). Dilthey’s model of an immanent, self-generative,
and worldly formation of networks of sense and meaning, which are not purely
ideal or transcendental for Dilthey, informed Heidegger’s rethinking of categories
as existentiell and existenzial structures even as Heidegger sought to eliminate their
ontic and human scientific dimensions that were so significant for Dilthey.
The Ontic and the Ontological
Dilthey argued that two ways of accessing the world are manifest in the math-
ematization of nature and in the hermeneutic articulation of historical life, but
neither can be taken as an absolute or exclusive perspective. Heidegger attempted
in his fundamental ontology to articulate a more basic dimension from which
to understand both nature and history and transcend their ontic and positivistic
interpretation. Though Dilthey unfolded historical worldly life as the basis for all
the sciences, this remained inadequate for Heidegger insofar as it did not reach the
ontological questions of the being of that life and of being as such. Nor, according
to Heidegger, did Dilthey achieve the necessary recognition of the difference and
the intertwining between the ontological and the ontic, of being and Da-Sein
(as Heidegger writes “Dasein” in his last detailed discussion of Dilthey), in the
“ontological difference.”
Heidegger’s final sustained critique of Dilthey in Introduction into Philosophy
(Einleitung in die Philosophie) turns against ontic difference (multiplicity) toward
a more originary ontological difference. Heidegger throws into question the ontic
difference of the empirical crucial to Dilthey as a practitioner of the human
sciences.7 Instead of denying ontic or empirical difference in the name of identity,
Heidegger questioned ontic multiplicity from the perspective of what he construed
7The problem of Heidegger’s monism is not of course new: Cassirer argued in 1931 that the
“reduction to temporal finitude” in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is a monism that undermines
the Kantian distinction between the knowable sensible and the unknowable supersensible. See
Michael Friedman 2000, 140–42.
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to be the more fundamental difference: the ontological difference between beings
and being. Indeed ontological difference is necessary to think ontic multiplicity. In
an intriguing passage from 1941, Heidegger claimed that: “As the same and the
unique, being is, of course, forever different in and from itself : : : . Being in its
uniqueness—and in addition to this, beings in their multiplicity” (BC, 44/GA 51,
52). Despite his critique of ontic difference in Dilthey, difference as ontological
uniqueness and ontic multiplicity continues to arguably play a role in his thinking
of being and beings.
According to Dilthey, a specifically modernistic conception of life-philosophy
calls for interpreting life from out of itself (GS 5, 370). Dilthey confronted the ide-
alization of the nonconceptual with the unavoidability of conceptual mediation and
self-reflection. Notwithstanding Dilthey’s hermeneutical approach to the categories
of life and the generation of meaning, Heidegger rejected Dilthey’s modernistic
epistemological focus while contending that Dilthey—while coming closest, but
like all “life-philosophy” in the end—did not adequately attain the categorical-
conceptual clarity and ontological character of the self-articulation of life (LQT,
182/GA 21, 216; BT, 45-46/SZ, 46).
Whereas the turn toward the immanence of life led Dilthey to empirical and
interpretive work in psychology, history, anthropology, and human scientific inquiry,
Heidegger demanded a more radical distinction between ontic inquiry into entities
(whether in the human or natural sciences) and the ontological task of phenomenol-
ogy and philosophy. Heidegger accordingly concluded that Dilthey: “did not pose
the question of historicity itself, the question of the sense of being, i.e., concerning
the being of beings. It is only since the development of phenomenology that we are
in a position to pose this question clearly” (S, 159).
Heidegger repeated the same charge in Being and Time. He credited Yorck with
prefiguring the ontological difference by distinguishing the historical-ontological
and the historiological-ontic (BT, 378-80/SZ, 399-400).8 This distinction is not
entirely absent in Dilthey, where it entails the unbreakable relation between history
as science and history as facticity. For Heidegger, it constitutes the difference
between the ontic science of history or historiography (Historie) and history as
ontological enactment, occurrence, and event (Geschichte). Heidegger separated
Historie from Geschichte, a tendency that culminated in his history of being
(Seinsgeschichte), whereas Dilthey emphasized the mediated intertwinement of
historical lived-experience (the lived history that we are) and historical research
(the academic history that we study) through self-reflection and interpretation.
Heidegger revisited the question of multiplicity in 1927 and maintained that in
Dilthey’s orientation toward the sciences and worldviews, being (Sein) is lost in
beings (Seiende), the world vanishes in a plurality of worlds, and the ontological
difference disappears in unending ontic differences (Heidegger GA 27, 367–68,
382–90). Human existence does not first ontically observe and inquire, generating
and building a world through its experiences as Dilthey’s hermeneutical formational
8See Eric S. Nelson 2011, 33.
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(Bildung) experientialism suggests, all interaction and learning presupposes the
primordial understanding and intuiting world as the world. This separation of
the ontological structure from the ontic superstructures in effect short-circuits the
hermeneutical oscillation between whole and part, universal and particular, since
there is a sense of the whole and the oneness of being that remains separate from
the merely ontic and empirical particular and part.
As with Husserl’s commitment to a conception of “the world” that excludes
the possibility of multiple potentially incommensurable worlds, Heidegger feared
the lack of unity, the inductive incompleteness, and the danger of relativity in
Dilthey. He concluded that this dangerous situation is a consequence of Dilthey’s
pre-phenomenological methodology. Heidegger noted that Dilthey prefigured phe-
nomenology and was one of the first to appreciate the radical nature of Husserl’s
project (GA 27, 367-68, 382–90). Nonetheless, Heidegger maintained throughout
his active reception of Dilthey’s work until 1927 that: “we are indebted to
him for valuable intuitions, which, however, do not reach down to ultimate and
primordial principles and to radical purity and novelty of method”; the self-evidence
of things phenomenologically or—in effect, intuitively, non-hermeneutically—
disclosed (TDP, 140/GA 56/57, 165; S, 160). Heidegger’s thinking never became
fully hermeneutical and the word itself disappears from his vocabulary after the
turn in his thinking in the 1930s.
Resistance and Factical Life9
According to Dilthey, the phenomenon of resistance facilitates the formation of a
worldly self—a self that cannot purely be itself to the extent that it is always thrown
and entangled in relations with others, objects. Self and resistant world are neither
independent nor derivative of the other, they are co-given or equiprimordial. It is
difference that is therefore the condition of self-identity.
Resistance is a primary feature of Dilthey’s thought for the early Heidegger.
Its significance is to some extent underestimated in the reception of Heidegger
due to his critique of “reality as resisting” in Being and Time (BT, 201/SZ, 209).
In that context, Heidegger rejected resistance as proving the externality of the
world, arguing that resistance already presupposes world. Despite his suspicion of
an epistemological and ontic conception of resistance, resistance probably remains
operative at various levels of Heidegger’s thinking—from the resistance of things in
the breakdown of their instrumental and pragmatic purposiveness to the resistance
of existence to human projects and understanding in the impossibility of mastering
and appropriating one’s own death.
This-worldly phenomena of resistance continue to structure Heidegger’s early
hermeneutics of factical life. Experience is still related to the “resistant” insofar
9A more detailed account of this argument can be found in Nelson 2011.
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as experience is both passive and active and implies a differentiating setting-apart-
with (Sich-Auseinander-setzen-mit) and the self-assertion of what is experienced
(PRL, 7/GA 60, 9). The origin and goal of philosophy is factical life understanding
and articulating itself. Thinking springs from its facticity in order to return to it
(PRL, 7, 11/GA 60, 8, 15). The resistance of facticity opens access to the world
through differentiation. It equally resists and blocks access to itself in the everyday
indifference of going along with things in factical life (PRL, 9, 11/GA 60, 12,
15-16).
Heidegger further modified Dilthey’s conception of resistance as the ruination,
counter-motility, and transversal of life. The “there” in and from which the “I”
occurs is primordially resistant and ruinating (Heidegger PIA, 139/GA 61, 185).
Regardless of Heidegger’s suspicion of resistance as an argument for the self-
existence of the external world, Dilthey’s notion of resistance is appropriated and
transformed in Heidegger’s thinking of life’s ownmost facticity.
In contrast to the portrayal of resistance as (1) the key to individuation and (2)
the counter-movement of life, which is immanent to life insofar as it is life itself
that presents us with its own ruination and questionability, (3) Heidegger critically
interprets Dilthey’s account of resistance in Being and Time (PIA, 98/GA 61,
130-31; BT, 201-03/SZ, 209-11). Magda King notes how resistance “characterizes
beings within the world, and by no means explains the phenomenon of the world”
(2001, 261). Resistance occurs from out of the world instead of being the how or
way in which the world can be grasped as world. It is significant that Heidegger
provides an ontological basis for resistance while rejecting its apparent ontic and
empirical character in Dilthey. Resistance: “gives a factical existence to understand
his exposedness to and dependence upon ‘a world of things’ which, in spite of all
technical progress, he can never master” (King 2001, 261).
Heidegger contended in his Kassel lectures that the epistemological and method-
ological aspects of Dilthey’s thinking need to be reconsidered in light of the
centrality of the question and conception of life. Historical knowledge is self-
reflexive; it turns on the self that relates to itself as well as to its immanent worldly
context. The life that reflects upon itself is confronted by its own historicity and
conditionality in attempting to comprehend itself. The self is accordingly a world
to itself along with an environing world and a world of others. For Heidegger, this
“self-world in factical life is neither a thing nor an ego in the epistemological sense”;
it has the character of “a definite significance, that of possibility” (GA 58, 232; PIA,
71/GA 61, 94).
The self-world is not a denial of others; it indicates how the “I” is unremittingly
referred to and shaped through interactions with others and the world in the
equiprimordiality of the self-world, with-world, and environing world (Heidegger
PIA, 71-72/GA 61, 95). These three overlapping co-constitutive worlds make up
the “life-world” such that they cannot be separated from each other or construed to
be self-sufficient (Heidegger PIA, 72-73/GA 61, 96). Hence, notwithstanding the
constitutive but cogiven significance of the self-world, Heidegger problematized the
primacy of the subject as separate from life. Life can neither be understood as merely
an object nor subject (GA 58, 236).
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Dilthey’s primary concern was with the historically embedded self and its
potential for self-knowledge in which the being who questions is at the same time
addressed by and included in the question of “who” it is. Life confronts me as
basically personal in the first-person perspective. It is my own life to live even as the
“subject” of that life is inevitably mediated and differentiated from itself by living in
a historical and worldly context: “To understand history cannot mean anything else
than to understand ourselves—not in the sense that we might establish various things
about ourselves, but that we experience what we ought to be. To appropriate a past
means to come to know oneself as indebted to that past” (Heidegger PS, 7/GA 19,
9–11). Life is not only the ground of knowledge, since it resists knowledge and life
as lived is in the last instance unknowable. The facticity of life is the “last ground of
knowledge,” such that knowledge cannot penetrate behind its own facticity (Dilthey
GS 13/1, 53).
Life endeavors to understand itself while remaining non-transparent and ineffable
to itself; human life is consequently necessarily interpretive or hermeneutical. Such
alterity, excess, and remainder that restlessly pulls life out of itself is a concern in
Heidegger’s thinking from the singular thisness (haecceitas) of his early work on
Duns Scotus to the thisness and mineness (Jemeinigkeit) of my existence in Being
and Time. As Dilthey explicated lived-experience as an exposure to life’s facticity
in its singularity and contingency, he should be considered a primary source for
interpreting Heidegger’s early philosophical project of a hermeneutics of factical,
or resistant, life.
Heidegger’s Final Confrontation with Dilthey
Heidegger unfolded his last sustained reading of Dilthey in Introduction into Phi-
losophy, in which he appears to be answering his critic and Dilthey’s student Georg
Misch. Heidegger proposed in §39 to analyze worldview as world-intuition. He
reinterprets intuition in opposition to its idealistic and vitalistic overtones in order
to rehabilitate it against the Dilthey-school’s “positivist” and “romantic” reliance
on the false objectivity of empirical observation and the potentially relativistic
subjectivity of artistic interpretation.
Heidegger redefines intuition as a “factically gripped being-in-the-world.” It
is “the differentiating confrontation [Auseinandersetzung]” between intuition and
world that “renders being in itself available and not mere observation” (GA 27, 344).
Heidegger construed Dilthey’s empirical focus as wrongly prioritizing observation,
which only accesses and discloses things ontically, inessentially, and in a derivative
manner. Empirical observation is a deficient mode of the manifestness of truth,
whereas intuition “expresses the immediate having of something in its entirety. Such
having, as a sought after ideal, includes in itself the orientation toward not-having,
not-possessing” (Heidegger GA 27, 344).
Observation and empirical inquiry in general presuppose intuiting as encounter-
ing and confronting things and the world as meaningful wholes without which they
could not appear to observation. Heidegger rehabilitated phenomenological intuition
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against his own earlier prioritizing of language and interpretation, Heidegger
reenacts the transcendental turn in the late 1920s, much like his teacher Husserl,
in response to the threat of hermeneutical relativity.
Intuition is not a direct immediate positive grasping but is rather structured by
not grasping, by lack and absence, and ultimately by the nothing. Worldview is a
world-having that cannot “have” the world. It is in “holding itself out in being-
in-the-world” in which the basic lack of bearing [Haltlosigkeit] of Da-Sein is
uncovered (Heidegger GA 27, 344). A worldview then merely offers the direction of
bringing the world into my possession. Da-Sein is each time an intuiting of world,
a having and not having of the world which it is. Worldview is, however, ordinarily
treated as something objectively present, a fulfilled having of the world. Contrary
to this reification of worldviews into fixed world-pictures, Heidegger shows how
worldview expresses the lack and absence of bearing of Da-Sein. To have a world is
to be decentered into the world (GA 27, 344-45).
Worldview is further misunderstood in the idea of a “natural worldview,” which
is incoherent because of the historicity of worldviews:
One means by this a holding-itself in being-in-the-world that is natural to every Da-Sein
and equal for each. Yet if every Da-Sein as factically existent is necessarily individuated in
a situation, then factically there is not something like a natural worldview. Every worldview
like every being-in-the-world is in itself historical, whether it knows this or not. There is no
one so-called natural worldview upon which a first formed worldview is grafted, as little as
a Da-Sein exists that would not always be the Da-Sein of the self and thereby dispersed in
relations of self and other [Ich-Du]. The denial of a natural worldview does not to be sure
imply that there is not something such as a common worldview, such as in groups, families,
tribes, nations, peoples. In another direction there is also a common world of particular
classes, castes, vocations. But this commonality is itself historical, according to the form as
well as in consideration of the content. (Heidegger GA 27, 345)
Dilthey had argued that there is no one natural worldview common to all
humans and that naturalism is only one possibility among others. Worldview is
essentially historical, which means particular in being the perspective of a life.
Dilthey argued further that the historicity of worldviews entails that there can be
no one master worldview that can be employed to conclusively evaluate and rank
the others. Instead, humans are confronted with the incommensurability, difference,
and conflict (Widerstreit) of a plurality of worldviews from out of the perspective of
their own personal life.
Heidegger confronted Dilthey’s notion of a unique factical biographical life and
its pluralization of human existence with a notion of human existence that cannot
be spoken in the plural and does not refer to the personal qualities and accidents of
a life: Da-Sein (“being-there”). Heidegger’s Da-Sein does not have the identity or
unity of a substance or subject even as it is contrasted with a conditional self that is
a formation or bundling of empirical conditions and experiences. The ontic “bundle
self” found in different ways in modern philosophers such as Hume, Nietzsche,
and Dilthey is rejected through the negative unity of Da-Sein. The wholeness of
Da-Sein is revealed in non-phenomena such as its anxiety, its profound boredom, its
uncontrollable anticipation of death, and—in §39 of Introduction into Philosophy—
its fundamental lack of orientation and bearing and dispersal amidst ontic beings
(Heidegger GA 27, 346).
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Heidegger proposed overcoming Dilthey’s conditional personal and reflective
self, i.e., his “psychological and epistemological concept of the subject,” through
a deeper more essential clarification of the way of being of Da-Sein (GA 27, 347).
Heidegger notes the bundle of divergent contingent elements operative in Dilthey’s
self: “World-picture, life-experience, life-ideal : : : actuality, value, determination of
the will are—according to Dilthey—aspects of worldview of ‘diverse provenance’
and various character (Heidegger GA 27, 347).” The next step of Heidegger’s
argument is that this ontic multiplicity from diverse sources in physical, biological,
and historical life grasped through a variety of methods such as causal explanations
and interpretive understandings cannot manifest the originary unity of Da-Sein. The
self-intuition of its wholeness cannot be positivistically decomposed into a bundle of
conditional elements. It is revealed at the ontological level of the question of being
and the disclosure of the nothing that no form of empiricism, even if it is holistic
and hermeneutical, can access.
Heidegger acknowledged that Dilthey interpreted world-views, including the
naturalistic worldview, as consisting of much more than causally known nature;
“the already known (Erkannte) operative in knowing (Erkennen), the lived psychic
experiential-nexus, and binding principles of action” (GA 27, 347). Heidegger in-
terpreted Dilthey’s pluralism to be relativistic. He cannot accept Dilthey’s inclusion
of causal explanation and causally known nature as an “objectively present at hand
ontic region” given in experience (Erfahrung) alongside regions that are subjectively
known, felt, and willed in lived experience (Erlebnis) or intersubjectively known
valid principles and virtues acted upon in practical ethical life. Heidegger’s negative
monism led him to repudiate Dilthey’s pluralistic argumentation that there are basic
forms of life- and world-views that are irreconcilable and irreducible to each other
much less to a more originary understanding of being (GA 27, 348-49).
Cognitive, evaluative, and voluntative comportments, the differentiation of
psychic-life that they presuppose and the life-stances and worldviews formed
through them, point toward a more fundamental bearing and comportment of the
same provenance: the bearing-lessness of Da-Sein in its worldly being (Heidegger
GA 27, 348-49). Heidegger maintains that Dilthey allows for the factical and
structural interconnection of all three dimensions, but he cannot move behind the
multiplicity of modes of givenness (GA 27, 350). As a proto-phenomenological
thinker, Dilthey failed to intuit their fundamental wholeness in the unity projected
through and enacted in the way of being of Da-Sein (Heidegger GA 27, 349).
We might well ask here: Ought this indeterminacy between subject and object,
the diverse ways of apprehending and the multiplicity of modes of givenness, be
rejected for the sake of the lingering transcendental-like unity of Da-Sein? The
problematic character of Heidegger’s approach to ontic difference and multiplicity
is revealed once again here. Can factical differences be eliminated in favor of the
negatively achieved formulation of the unity of Da-Sein and Being? Heidegger
challenged the priority of ontic difference at work in Dilthey’s thought in the name
of a more fundamental difference from out of which ontic multiplicity must be
thought. Heidegger’s ontological reduction of the ontic dualistically threatens to
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undermine the recognition of and inquiry into ontic affairs. Heidegger’s bracketing
and subsequent radical critique of scientific inquiry into empirical conditions
becomes the reification of a self-absorbed contemplation that listens to nothing but
itself.
Dilthey is limited by his bundle theory of the self, according to Heidegger, while
at the same time pointing toward the genuine subjectivity of the subject. Since
Dilthey refers ontic multiplicity to the consciousness that apprehends it, there is
a gesture toward the phenomenological unity of Da-Sein. This conception failed to
the extent that it suggests a merely “psychological subject.” Heidegger’s argument
for a subject behind the conditional worldly self reveals his lingering commitments
to the idea of a transcendental phenomenological subject. This allowed Heidegger
to claim that Dilthey’s interpretive psychology remained beholden to the causal
psychology that it differentiated itself from, as Dilthey did not adequately bracket
causal conditions. This is a misinterpretation of Dilthey’s project in light of the
phenomenological project, since Dilthey never advocated the exclusion of causal
reasoning even in the heart of interpretive psychology.
Heidegger contended that the failure of the bundle understanding of the self is
interconnected with Dilthey’s failure to achieve a decisive understanding of history.
According to Heidegger, the question of Da-Sein is merely a psychological one in
Dilthey, who considers the self as an ontic nexus of mental and physical occurrences.
Instead of pursuing the question of the way of being of Da-Sein, Dilthey is trapped
in a “higher positivism” in which Da-Sein, “on the basis of psychology,” is a
“problem of knowledge, theory of science, and culture.” Because of this purported
lack of radicalness, Dilthey’s “most important insight of the historicity of life is not
understood fundamentally, because it is not thought ontologically-metaphysically”
(Heidegger GA 27, 350). Despite Dilthey’s recognition of the difference between
the history that we are (Geschichte) and the study of history (Historie), which
Yorck and Heidegger adopted, Dilthey did not grasp history as Da-Sein’s own
history. Dilthey introduced the problematic of historicity, but could not answer
it, since history is interpreted as “cultural expression, the objectification of the
psychologization of life, and an aesthetics of historicity and culture” (Heidegger
GA 27, 350-51).
As a modernistic post-metaphysical thinker, Dilthey argued that we cannot go
behind the multiplicity of ontic phenomena and the varying modes of givenness to
reach an underlying metaphysical being, essence, or substance. Heidegger’s project
is to rehabilitate the metaphysical through a negative ontology. He accordingly
concluded that Dilthey is captured in an ontic perspectivalism that precludes
adequately posing the question of the way of Da-Sein’s being and of course the
question of being itself. These two questions are negatively formulated and positive
attributes are denied in order to avoid identifying being-there and being itself with a
substance, principle or essence behind or beyond immanence even as Da-Sein leaps
beyond and transcends worldly affairs.
Dilthey’s psychology presupposes in Heidegger’s estimation the ontological
question of Da-Sein’s mode of being just as the ontic multiplicity of factualties
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and facticities presupposes the ontological question of being (Heidegger GA 27,
351). Dilthey implicitly relies on an ontology of the human that it explicitly
strives to exclude by interpreting humans ontically and empirically. Because this
ontological question is excluded, the ontology of the human remains caught within
the Western tradition of the subject that understands humans as rational animals.
Dilthey remains within this ambiguous multiplicity, presupposing and using Da-
Sein without clarifying it (Heidegger GA 27, 352).
The primordial structure of Da-Sein as a whole, which Dilthey implicitly and
ambiguously employed in his quasi-phenomenology, is: “transcendence as being-
in-the-world; Da-Sein is as such transcendence; it has in each case already jumped
beyond beings : : : .” (Heidegger GA 27, 353-54). Da-Sein already has in each case
an understanding of being, beings, and its own being. This unitary understanding
leaps ahead of beyond the scientist’s observation and studying of things such
as minerals, butterflies, and stratification into social classes. It jumps beyond
and in doing so jumps back to the unitary origin of the multiplicity of modes
of comportment and givenness described and analyzed by Dilthey (Heidegger
GA 27, 353). Dilthey’s subjective, objective, subjective-objective intersubjective
dimensions of worldview each belongs to the comportment of Da-Sein as lack of
bearing in the world and transcendence.
Dilthey’s ontic comportment consequently requires a transcendental turn to
the ontological comportment of Da-Sein’s transcendence in the world. Heidegger
locates the transcendental in the transcendence that reveals the nothingness and lack
of bearing to which humans are exposed (GA 27, 353). Instead of rejecting ontic
differences for the sake of the unity or identity of a positive essence or substance,
ontic difference is only possible for Heidegger on the basis of the originary
difference of Da-Sein—its thrownness into nothingness and the fundamental lack
of bearing of its worldly comportment. Heidegger’s monistic critique of Dilthey’s
pluralism is of a “higher order.” The wholeness of Da-Sein is glimpsed in exposure
to the via negativa of anxiety, boredom, and lack of bearing in death, nothingness,
and the ontological difference.
Heidegger contends that a worldview is not formed out of multiple and hetero-
geneous aspects and elements. World-viewing is an originary unified phenomenon
arising from the transcendence of Da-Sein in its nothingness and lack of bearing
(Heidegger GA 27, 354). Da-Sein is in each case betrayed and endangered in its
transcendence-in-the-world; in “the each time of the facticity of transcendence”
(GA 27, 358, 367). As such, Da-Sein does not first engage, observe, and inquire, but
understands and “intuits the world” as one world through confrontation and conflict
(GA 27, 367–68, 382–90). Dilthey’s elucidation of the conflict of worldviews and
interpretations also one-sidedly points toward the truth that difference, conflict,
and violence are constitutive of the wholeness of Da-Sein for Heidegger. The
fundamental differences between perspectives led Dilthey to advocate a liberal
tolerance and genial dialogue between them. Heidegger, however, rejected the
multiplicity of perspectives and forms of life as leaving the necessary and needful
in ambiguity and indecision.
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Conclusion
Heidegger was less swayed by Dilthey’s personalist interpretive psychology, even
as he appreciated Dilthey as a thinker of human life as immanently worldly, self-
interpretive, historical, and affective (Heidegger HCT, 117/GA 20, 161).10 Dilthey’s
project was, from Heidegger’s standpoint, a flawed anti-naturalist personalism
and a failed phenomenology that gave the naturalistic and historicist approaches,
impersonal positivistic and personal aesthetic and biographical perspectives, too
much validity (Heidegger HCT, 117/GA 20, 161). As scientific inquiry and the
contingencies of personal auto-biographical life are beneath the dignity of philos-
ophy, Dilthey is an ambiguous source for the new phenomenology and philosophy
advocated by Heidegger.
Heidegger’s criticisms did not go unanswered. Heidegger’s earliest critics in-
cluded former students of Dilthey, such as Misch, or scholars inspired by the “spirit”
of his philosophical project, such as Helmuth Plessner. Misch’s Lifephilosophy
and Phenomenology (Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie) is one of the first
sustained detailed critiques of Heidegger, which he responded to in his lecture-
courses and correspondence.
Dilthey’s full hermeneutical legacy only partially resonates in the ontologi-
cally oriented hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer. Neither of them further
articulated the emergence and individuation of the biographical human individual
immanently from the mediating contexts of a natural-biological and social-historical
life. In contrast to Dilthey’s historical-anthropological approach to human existence,
Heidegger affirmed the dignity of the ontological and the transcendental against
the complex mediations of life that call for continuing empirical observation,
experimental inquiry, and interpretive understanding.
Misch responded that Heidegger marginalized the discourses of the natural and
human sciences as ontic by separating them from the tasks of fundamental ontology.
Heidegger did not recognize therefore the basic role that particular sciences play not
only in research but in critical self-reflection. According to Misch, the “dispersion”
into an ontic multiplicity that Heidegger criticizes in Dilthey is not a fall or decay
“into” confusion but ontic multiplicity is the very starting point of life and reflection.
Such multiplicity is not the negation of the essence and dignity of philosophy,
if it is the arena in which philosophy takes place as an event and enactment
not of impersonal being and neutral Dasein—a formal neutrality that is derived
“after the fact” from the partiality and perspectivality of historical life in Misch’s
estimation—but, extending Dilthey’s interpretive individualism, of individual and
personal biographical life (Misch 1931, 47).11
10Compare E. von Aster 1935, 149, 155.
11On Misch’s pluralistic and life-immanent personalism, in contrast with Heidegger’s history of
being, see Nelson 2012.
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A basic move repeated throughout Heidegger’s career is the claim that an-
thropology, psychology, and the entire range of human sciences, have nothing
to say in response to the question of what it means to be human. This polemic
against scientific inquiry, including the human sciences, is unfolded initially vis-à-
vis Dilthey’s pluralistically and empirically oriented manner of philosophizing that
draws on the natural and human sciences of his day. Accordingly, it was not in
Heidegger or Gadamer, but in the bio-hermeneutical anthropology of Plessner and
the hermeneutical logic of Misch that the historically mediated character of nature
and spirit continues to be analyzed in a way that combines critical self-reflection
and inquiry into the ontic multiplicity of the world.
Resonating with Dilthey’s elucidation of an individuated self in the midst of the
conditions and forces of natural and historical life, Plessner corrected the partiality
of naturalism and an anti-naturalistic personalism by clarifying their immanent
consistency in the formation of a relational self: that is, the naturally eccentric and
artificial constructive animal called human occurring within historical life.12
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